This paper explores the use of fuzzy regression-discontinuity design in the context where multiple treatments are applied at the threshold. The identification result shows that, under a very strong assumption of equality of treatment probability changes at the cutoff point, a difference in fuzzy discontinuity identify a treatment effect of interest. Using the data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), we apply this identification strategy to evaluate the causal effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on health care access and utilization of old Americans. We find results suggesting that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act has led to an increase in the hospitalization rate of elderly American-5% more hospitalization. It has caused a minor increase of cost-related direct barrier to access to care-3.6% increase in the probability of delaying care for cost reasons. The ACA has also exacerbated cost-related barriers to follow-up and continuity care-7% more elderly couldn't afford prescriptions, 7% more couldn't see a specialist and, 5.5% more couldn't afford a follow-up visit-as result of ACA.
Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is the most important change in U.S. health care policy since the creation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. The aim of the ACA was to increase the number of insured people, improve the quality of care, and control health care costs. Although coverage gains from the ACA implementation are well documented (e.g. Courtemanche et al. 2017b and Frean et al. 2017) , relatively little is known about its effects on access to care and health care services utilization. The main empirical challenge in estimating such effects is the identification problem that arises because many parts of the ACA overlapped with the previous existing Medicare and Medicaid programs.
The contribution of this paper is both theoretical and empirical. First, we propose an identification and estimation method to isolate and estimate the partial effect of the treatment of interest in scenarios in which multiple treatments are assigned in a fuzzy manner at the same cutoff. We call this new methodology "fuzzy difference-indiscontinuities".
1 Second, we use this methodology to recover the ceteris paribus effect of the ACA on access to care and health care services utilization using data on an important segment of the population: seniors at age 65. We exploit the fact that at age 65 there is a sudden change in the ACA and Medicare eligibility and enrollment, and compare health-care-related outcomes among seniors just before and just after the age of 65 (as in Card et al. 2008) , and before and after the ACA was introduced. Our "fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities" methodology relies on the availability of a panel data or pooled cross-sections sample of the population where at least one cohort is eligible to all the policies and others are eligible to all but the policy of interest. Our identification results show that, under a strong assumption of equality of treatments probabilities at the cutoff, a fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities identifies the treatment effect of interest. In the case where the probabilities of treatment are not equal, point identification of the treatment effect using the fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities is impossible. We propose an estimable bound of the treatment effect under milder assumptions. Our identification results are widely applicable and suggest some caution when applying before and after methodology in presence of fuzzy discontinuities.
Our methodology extents existing works on regression discontinuity and the use of "before-and-after" methodologies. By showing that a fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities identifies a local average treatment effect, we propose results similar to those in Hahn 1 In naming this methodology fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities we follow Grembi et al. (2016) , who proposed a "difference-in-discontinuities" approach that combines features of the regression discontinuity and the difference-in-differences designs. As we will mention below, our methodology generalizes Grembi et al. (2016) 's results. The econometric problem we -and Grembi et al.-are dealing with can be viewed as a specific case of the general question of the evaluation of the pure effect of a policy intervention in presence of confounding interventions. It can be related to the literature of competing risk in survival analysis (see Fine and Gray (1999) for a description of competing risk models). In survival analysis, the end of life may occur because of one of the risks, while in economics the change in the outcomes may come from the policy of interest or a confounding one. The main difficulty in economics is that treatment decision is most of the time endogenous and their effects are heterogenous. How the existence of a confounding policy affects another policy evaluation method such as PSM, diff-in-diffs, synthetic control matching or, IV is left for future research.
2 As we will mention below, we basically combine Card et al. (2008) 's fuzzy regression discontinuity design and a difference-in-differences design.
proportion of individuals who couldn't afford to pay prescription drugs increased by 7.0%. This effect is heterogeneous by ethnicity and education level. The proportion of Hispanics who could not afford drugs increased by 23.3% while the proportion of White non-Hispanics increased by 6.7%. The proportion of individuals with at least some college education who couldn't afford to pay prescription drugs increased by 11.4%. Access to continuity care was also affected with an increase in the proportion of those who couldn't afford to see a specialist, and have a follow-up treatment, by 7.2%, and 5.5%, respectively. The increased in cost-related barriers to continuity was more apparent for high school drop-out, and inability to afford to see a specialist was more prevalent for White non-Hispanics (7.3% more) and 15.1% more individuals form Minorities couldn't afford follow-up visit.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the US institutional background with an emphasis on the ACA and changes induce to Medicare. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework for the identification of the effect of the ACA on seniors health care access and utilization. The results of our empirical investigations are discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 provides a discussion of the results and a conclusion.
Institutional Background
The ACA introduced significant changes into the U.S. national insurance programMedicare and Medicaid. These changes intended to reduce Medicare costs, expand access to health care services, promote quality of care, and expand drug coverage. Prior to the ACA, at age 65 people who worked 40 quarters or more in covered employment were eligible to Medicare, and could also be eligible for Medicaid if they had low-income. These eligibility conditions are maintained with the ACA.
Medicare (and the ACA's Medicare version) has four parts. Hospital insurance (Part A) provides broad coverage of inpatient expenses, including not only hospital visits, but inpatient care in skilled nursing facilities, hospice care and home health services. The coverage is free of charge. Part B or medical insurance covers medical services including physician and nursing fees, and also preventive services. Enrollees pay a modest monthly premium. Advantage (Part C) provided by private insurance; it covers the essential of Part A and Part B benefits plus urgent and emergency care services. The monthly premiums vary widely across private insurers.
6 Finally, Part D -prescription drug coverage was enacted in 2003 to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and increase access to prescription medications for seniors and disabled persons.
In 2010, the U.S. government enacted the ACA with three main objectives: increasing the number of insured, improving the quality of care, and controlling health care costs. The ACA brought changes and improvements to Medicare and Medicaid. For example, the ACA has gradually reduced payments to Medicare private insurance companies (Part C): on average, the payment amounts per enrollee decreased by about 6% in 2014. One of the major financial burden on Medicare Part D beneficiaries was the socalled "donut hole", a coverage gap where beneficiaries are required to pay out-of-pocket the full cost of their medications. The ACA has gradually reduced the beneficiaries' cost burden and made the prescription drugs more affordable for Medicare Part D beneficiaries. The donut hole has been narrowing each year since the ACA was passed in 2010. In 2011, Medicare part D enrollees in the donut hole were only responsible for 50% of the cost of brand-name drugs. The gap was scheduled to close in 2020, when beneficiaries would be expected to pay 25% of the cost of all their prescriptions while they were in the donut hole.
Before the ACA seniors with high-income i.e., seniors with income above $85,000, and couples above $170,000 were paying higher part B premiums. The ACA has extended this measure to Medicare Part D by increasing the premiums for higher-income enrollees. In 2013, around 4% of Part D beneficiaries, and 5% of Part B beneficiaries, paid additional premiums based on their income.
8 Medicare beneficiaries have had access to free preventives care services due to the ACA. 9 In 2011, over 20 million individuals with Medicare received free preventive services.
In order to lower Medicare spending and improve the quality of the health services, starting in 2014 the ACA has changed the fee-for-service payment system that rewards only quantity to adopt a payment system based on quality and value. For example, hospitals with high readmission rates receive lower payments. Moreover, the new payment system includes financial incentives for care providers to report on different quality measures, including quality measures that account for the patient's experience.
The main ACA coverage provisions took effect by 2014 (Obama, 2016) . Figure 1 in Obama (2016) shows that the percentage of individuals without insurance in the U.S. substantially dropped in 2014. This is consistent with Sommers et al. (2016) and Courtemanche et al. (2017a) , who, as previously mentioned, document an increase in health insurance coverage as a consequence of the implementation of the ACA. However, also as previously suggested, it is unclear if this improvement in coverage lead to lesser the barriers to care. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of ACA on health care services access and utilization on seniors aged 65 at the year 2014, and focus on the change occurred between 2012 and 2014.
Theory of the Identification and Estimation in Presence of Multiple Policies
Consider a setting with a population of N individuals, each one born in one of C cohorts. Let Y ic be an outcome (e.g a health related indicator), where i = 1, ..., N indexes the individuals, and c = 1, ..., C indexes the cohorts. Define O ic as an indicator variable that identifies whether the individual i born in cohort c is affected by our policy of interest, which in the empirical application is the ACA. Before the introduction of O ic , another policy was already in place. Let M ic be an indicator variable that identifies whether the individual i born in cohort c participated in this second and the confounding policy. In our case M ic will be Medicare.
10 The selection of participants in M ic is partially determined by a forcing variable X ic , and changes discontinuously at the cutoff t. Specifically, we say that an individual i born in cohort c is treated -with a higher probability-when X ic > t.
11 In our empirical application X ic is the age of individual i, and t is age 65.
12 The selection of participants in O ic is also partially determined by X ic and t, but also depends on the cohort to which the individual belongs. In this respect we distinguish between two types of cohorts, old and young, denoted by L andL, respectively, and say that individual i is treated by O ic only if it belongs to the older cohort, L.
Even though we focus on a fuzzy setting, it is useful to describe the assignment mechanism previously described for the case O ic and M ic are deterministic. In this case,
and
Define Y ic (o, m) as the potential outcome of individual i from cohort c if O ic = o and M ic = m, where m, o ∈ {0, 1}, with 1 corresponding to being treated and 0 otherwise. By (1) and (2) the observed outcome is therefore equal to
In this setting, we aim at identifying the causal effect of O ic on Y ic . We focus on the average treatment effect of O ic at t, that we denoted by AT E O (t), and define as
If O ic would be the only treatment changing at t, the cross-sectional regression discontinuity estimator would identify the average treatment effect of O ic at t. However, in our setting this estimator will lead to a biased estimate of the AT E O (t) because of the impossibility of separating the effect of O ic from the effect of M ic .
Define AT E(t) as the cross-sectional regression discontinuity estimator and let AT E M (t) be the effect of M ic before O ic . In the case of a sharp discontinuity, Grembi et al. (2016) showed that AT E O (t) can be identified using what they call a difference-indiscontinuities estimator. Specifically, they show that AT E O (t) = AT E(t) − AT E M (t). However, in a fuzzy scenario it is reasonable to think that this result does not hold anymore -without any additional assumptions. As suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010) , in many settings of economic interest, the cutoff only partly determines the treatment 10 Or, equivalently, the part of Medicare existing before the ACA. 11 That the treatment status is partially determined by a forcing variable X ic means that individuals for which X ic < t may also be treated by the policy. This makes the participation in the program fuzzy.
12 Note that having Medicare (or the ACA) before 65 is also possible (as long as other conditions -as disability-are met), some seniors keep their work insurance after 65, so participation in both programs is fuzzy.
6 status. It is therefore possible that the change in the probability of participation differs over time and over policies.
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In the following section we investigate assumptions under which the difference in the fuzzy discontinuities identifies a policy-relevant quantity when multiple treatments are applied at the same cutoff. As previously mentioned, our theoretical framework follows Hahn et al. (2001) 's model and extends it to multiple treatments using panel or pooled cross-sectional data with a possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects or sample selection.
Fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities: Identification
Let us define, borrowing the notation from Hahn et al. (2001) , the limits Z + = lim
, where Z ic is any random variable.
To identify the causal effect of O ic , we consider the following estimand,
We call τ
F RD O
in (5) a "fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities" estimator because, as Grembi et al. (2016) 's estimator, it rests on the intuition of combining a differencein-differences strategy and a regression discontinuity design, but in our setting, the regression discontinuity design is fuzzy. Now we provide a set of assumptions under which τ
in (5) identifies the AT E O (t) in (4). In our empirical application this means establishing the conditions under which τ
identifies the local AT E of the ACA at age 65. All the assumptions will be conditional on X ic being in the neighborhood of the cutoff t. Assumption 1. The conditional expectation of each potential outcomes is continuous in x at t. This first assumption is standard in the regression discontinuity literature. It says that the conditional expectation of all potential outcomes are continuous at the cutoff point. This second assumption states that the decision to take the treatment is independent of the potential outcomes, i.e., that individuals cannot self-select into the treatment based on their expected benefits. This assumption will be relaxed later to allow for some self-selection.
Assumption 3. The effect of the confounding policy M ic in the case of no treatment (O ic = 0) is constant over units:
where C is the set of all cohorts in the sample.
In Assumption 3 the effect of the confounding policy is required to be the same before and after the ACA. In other words, it requires observations just below and just above the cutoff to be on a (local) parallel trend in the absence of the policy of interest. This assumption is similar to the standard identifying assumption for difference-indifferences specifications (Abadie 2005) . (ii) are standard regression discontinuity assumptions for the two policies. Assumption 4.(iii) is specific to our setting, and states that O ic and M ic must be independent. This assumption is similar to that used in competing risk survival analysis, and, specifically, to the result that if the cause of death (corresponding to treatments in our case) are not independent, the joint survival function cannot be identified (see for instance Crowder 1991 , Crowder 2000 . In our case, without the independence assumption, quantities like E[O ic M ic |X ic ] cannot be identified from the data because of lack of information on the joint distribution of M and O.
Assumption 5. The discontinuity in the probability of treatment is the same for all policies at the threshold i.e.
Assumption 5 is completely new, and its formulation is one of the contributions of this paper. It requires that the discontinuity in the probability of selection of each policy to be the same as well as the joint probability of selection. This assumption is clearly satisfied when the discontinuity is sharp. Therefore, our identification results generalize those of Grembi et al. (2016) to the fuzzy case with heterogenous treatment effects. The following theorem gives conditions for the identification of the treatment of interest. 
Applying Assumption 3 to equation (7) and dividing each of the previous equations by
Under Assumptions 1 to 5, the right-hand side of (8) becomes AT E O (t). This means that the fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities estimator identifies the local causal effect of the ACA.
Note that the proof of Theorem 1 comprises two moments: first, Assumptions 1 to 4 lead to the difference-in-discontinuity expression in equation (8); then, when Assumption 5 is applied, all the terms other than AT E O (t) are cancelled.
Theorem 1 provides conditions allowing us to identify the local causal effect of the treatment of interest. Assumption 5, while being strong, is a testable assumption: the three terms to which Assumption 5 imposes a strict equality represent the discontinuities in program participation at the threshold.
Note that in empirical applications, Assumptions 1 to 4 (i) and (ii) can easily be satisfied. As previously mentioned, these assumptions are similar to those used in a standard regression discontinuity design. However, the independence assumption between the two treatment -Assumption 4.(iii)-is strong, and, unfortunately, nontestable. The following assumption relaxes it, and imposes a sort of dominance of the treatment of interest on the confounding treatment.
The following proposition proposes an alternative set of conditions under which our fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities estimator identifies the treatment effect of interest. 
− is enough for Assumption 5 to be verified.
The assumptions under which Proposition 1 holds are slightly less restrictive than those for Theorem 1. Moreover, and importantly, the restrictions O ic ≥ M ic and
− are empirically testable. These two relations together imply that almost the same group of individuals should participated to the programs at the cutoff. The strict equality in Assumption 4'.(iii), even though less restrictive than Assumption 5, is however still very strong, as it means that in case of strict inclusion the difference on both side of the cutoff should be similar. If there is selection on unobservable, the assumption may not hold. The following assumption provides a more realistic and feasible alternative to Assumption 5.
Assumption 5'. The difference in the discontinuity in the probability of treatment of the confounding policy is bounded at the threshold, i.e. 1−
. Assumption 5' restricts the differences in the discontinuity at the threshold to be bounded. Under Assumption 4, the difference is always bounded. We also assume that the effect of the second treatment would had been the same with or without the confounding treatment. The following theorem relaxes Assumption 5, which leads to the inability to point identify the treatment effect of interest using a fuzzy diff-in-discs. Instead, we propose estimable bounds. and an estimator of the confounding treatment effect.
otherwise
Proof. As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, when Assumption 1 to 4 are satisfied,
Under the assumption 5' that O ic would had the same treatment effect without M ic , we can also say that
And it is easy to see that (12) implies (9), when AT E M (t) is positive, and (10) when AT E M (t) is negative.
The upper and the lower bounds in (9) and (10) are quantities that can be estimated. The these bounds are the smallest possible, i.e., they are sharp. Indeed, we can obtain a consistent estimate ofρ by estimating all elements in
The bounds obtained in Theorem 2 are under the assumption of independence between the two treatments. In the following proposition, this assumption is relaxed and replaced by the assumption of inclusion of one treatment in the other. Moreover, we allow the changes in the probabilities of treatment to be different at the cutoff. 
is point identified by τ
, we have thatρ = 0, and the result follows form (12).
The result in Proposition 2 show an alternative way to point identify the treatment effect using a transformation of the difference in discontinuity estimator.
We have so far presented partial and point identification results assuming that there was no selection based on potential outcomes (i.e. Assumption 2). This limited its applicability. The following assumption helps us to generalize our identification results to scenarios with selection on unobservables.
(iii) There exists an ε > 0 such that for e > 0 sufficiently small (i.e. such that 0 < e < ε ) P ({M ic 1 (t + e) − M ic 1 (t − e) = 1}) = P ({M ic 2 (t + e) − M ic 2 (t − e) = 1}) for any c 2 ∈ L and c 1 ∈L = C L. identifies a local average treatment effect, i.e.,
Proof. Let us consider the following quantity
Using an argument similar to that in Hahn et al. (2001) , Theorem 3, the last expression is equivalent to
Applying a similar argument to the older cohort, we also have that
Under Assumptions 6 and 3, we have that
, letting e goes to zero, and applying Assumption 5, we obtain (13).
We have shown that the use of a difference-in-discontinuities design can help to separate the effect of a policy of interest from a confounding treatments. This can be achieved when there is or not selection on the returns at the threshold. Theorem 3 shows that our fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities estimator identifies the LATE at the discontinuity point.
Regarding our empirical application, note that we are in a situation where eligibility does not mean participation, since the choice of taking Medicare before or after the ACA can be driven by factors that are unobservable to the econometrician but known by the agent. The causal effect we are therefore going to estimate can be best described as a LATE. The compliers group is formed by the elderly whose decision to use Medicare or the ACA's version of Medicare is driven by their eligibility because of their age.
The identification results presented in this section show conditions for point identification of AT E O (t). We showed that point identification can occur in two scenarios. First, the two treatments are independent, and the changes in the treatment probability for both treatments are equal at the cutoff point. Second, the two treatments are not independent, but the pre-existing treatment is included in the treatment of interest when its application starts. Additionally, we can relax the assumption of equality of treatment probability changes at the cutoff point and add an assumption of the additivity of the treatment effects (
In all the cases, our result of point identification using a fuzzy diff-in-discs relies on strong assumptions. For instance, the independence assumption is not testable (Crowder 1991) . In the case of strict inclusion of the pre-existing treatment in the treatment of interest, the assumption of equality of treatment probability changes at the cutoff point means that the difference should stay exactly the same above and below the cutoff. When the equality of treatment probability changes assumption is relaxed, an additivity assumption is required for point identification, ruling out the case of strict superadditivity ( , 0)) and the estimator used is not a direct differencein-discontinuities estimator.
Estimation and Inference
The estimation and inference of the effects of the policy mentioned in the previous section can be done using a reduced form approach or a nonparametric approach. In this subsection, we present the steps of the nonparametric procedure. The choice of presenting this approach is linked to its intuitive connection with the identification results. However, because of several limitations of the existing estimation methods for our specific case, and to be able to compare our results with those of Card et al. (2008) , in our empirical application we use the reduced form approach. In the next section we explain how we implement this approach, which essentially consists of a two stages least square combined with a difference-in-differences style procedure.
The estimation of the treatment effect of interest was obtained using fuzzy differencein-discontinuities design via a difference in two ratios. We showed that under Assumptions 1 to 5 or 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, the difference in the ratios
identifies the treatment effect of the relevant policy at X = t. Therefore, to obtain consistent estimator for τ
F RD F
, we can use consistent estimators ofŶ
To estimate these quantities it is common to apply some nonparametric regression techniques (see Hahn et al. (2001) , and Porter (2003) , Otsu et al. (2015) ). The parameters can be estimated by local linear regression estimators, which have better boundary properties than traditional kernel regression (see for instance Fan 1992) , and are optimal (see for instance Porter 2003) .
The estimator for Y + is given by a solution to the following weighted least square problem, whereŶ + =â:
where K is the kernel function and h = h N the bandwidth satisfying h → 0 as N → ∞. The other quantities included in the first ratio on the right of (17) are estimated using the same type of procedure as in (18). Depending on the quantity we are interested in, Y ic is replaced by T ic . The minimisation is made on X ic ≥ t or X ic ≤ t to get the upper and lower limit estimators, respectively. Note that in the estimation of this first ratio we use individuals from the cohort to which both policies are applied.
To obtain the treatment effect of our policy of interest, we need an estimate of the second ratio on the right of (17). In the estimation of the terms composing this second ratio we follow a similar procedure to that applied to the elements of the first ratio, but with only one difference: the sample now consist of those individuals living in the cohort to which only one policy (the confounding policy) is applied. For instance, the estimator forȲ + is given by solutions to the following weighted least square problems with respect to a i.e.Ŷ + =â,
The use of two independent samples to evaluate the two ratios ensure us of the independence of these quantities. Following Theorem 4 of Hahn et al. (2001) , the asymptotic distribution of the estimator is normally distributed with mean given by the difference in means of the two ratios, and the variance given by the sum of the variances.
14 The conventional Wald-type confidence set for τ
F RD O
can be obtained by estimating asymptotic variances of the non-parametric estimator, or by using an appropriate bootstrap method.
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The use of this non-parametric approach is implemented via a selection of a smoothing parameter h. In the case of the standard regression discontinuity design, this parameter can be chosen optimally using data-driven selection methods (see for instance Kalyanaraman 2012 and Calonico et al. 2014 ). In the case of a fuzzy discontinuity, Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) suggest to proceed as in Imbens and Lemieux (2008) , by estimating two optimal bandwidths, one for the main regression outcome and one for the treatment. In order to apply this recommendation to our case, we have to select four optimal bandwidths. The selection of these bandwidths are theoretically based on homoscedasticity assumptions which may not hold for the panel type data we have in hand. Moreover, while being optimally chosen by criteria of minimisation of the integrated mean square error, the effect of the bandwidths choice on inference is also of interest. Indeed, Calonico et al. (2014) show that confidence interval constructed using these bandwidths are not valid. They proposed a new theory-based, more robust confidence interval estimators for average treatment effects. To our knowledge, no study has generalized this theory to difference-in-discontinuities settings. The generalization of this theory to these settings (sharp and fuzzy), while being important, are left for future investigation. Thus, given the theoretical limitations of the non-parametric approach, we restrict our attention to the use of a reduced-form model. We describe this approach in the next section, in the context of our empirical application.
Effect of the Affordable Care Act
As previously mentioned, we use a reduced-form approach to estimate the effect of ACA on the utilization of health care services by elderly Americans. Besides the theoretical limitations of the non-parametric approach, the use of a reduced-form enables us to compare our results with those by Card et al. (2008) .
We restrict our attention to linear regression functions using observations distributed within a distance of 10 years on both sides of the age 65 cutoff, before and after the 14 The speed of convergence is n 2 5 , and h = O p (n − 1 5 ) where n = min(N 1 , N 2 ) with N 1 the number of individuals in P and N 2 the number of individuals inL. The asymptotic results can be established with a balanced sample in the two cohorts. If the samples are not balanced we can drop the excess number randomly.
15 Another alternative may be to use the empirical likelihood-based inference methods proposed by Otsu et al. (2015) which circumvent the asymptotic variance estimation issues and have data-determined shapes. However, the procedure needs to be extended to account for the panel data nature of our data set that may come with heteroscedasticity issues. implementation of the ACA. We also explore robustness to the inclusion of secondorder polynomial terms of age along with interactions and use a smaller bandwidth. As discussed below, the estimated discontinuities are generally robust.
Specifically, we estimate the following model (20) and
where X ic is the age of individual i of the cohort c, X * ic is a dummy equal to one if this individual is above the 65 age threshold, D c is an indicator for the post-ACA period, and f (X ic , D c ) is a polynomial function of X ic whose terms include interactions with D c . As the design is not sharp, M ic , the participation to medicare, and O ic , the participation to ACA, are only partly determined by crossing the age 65 cutoff. Indeed, as previously mentioned, some individuals are eligible to Medicare before 65 for disability reasons, and after 65 eligibility is subject to having worked at least 40 quarters in covered employment. The estimator of the coefficient τ
is our fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities estimator, and we obtain it through a two stage least squares type estimation.
16
We consider several outcome variables (Y ic ), all related to health care access or use: whether the person delayed care last year for cost reasons, whether the person did not get care last year for cost reasons, whether the person saw a doctor or went to the hospital last year, whether the person could afford prescription medicine, see a specialist, follow-up care last year, and whether the person could get appointment soon enough last year.
Data
We use survey data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS).
17 In our baseline specification, we focus on the years 2012 and 2014, the reason being that, as previously mentioned, even though states varied significantly in their approach to implementing the ACA, in many states crucial actions were largely put into motion during 2013. Thus, for those states in which these actions occurred, the year 2013 is a reasonable cutoff for the ACA implementation. Then, we take the years 2012 and 2014 as representing two moments in which crucial components related to the ACA had been either not implemented or implemented.
18
For the years 2012 and 2014, the NHIS reports respondents' birth year and birth month, and the calendar quarter of the interview. We use this information to identify the age (in quarters) of the respondents. As in Card et al. (2008) , we suppose that a person who reaches his sixty-fifth birthday in the interview quarter is age 65 and 0 16 The model in equation (20) is specific to reflect the general theoretical framework proposed in the previous section. However, in practice, the implementation of ACA for individuals at age 65, as discussed in the background section, consists in an extension of existing Medicare benefits. This means that the model estimated is simpler and given by quarters, and assuming a uniform distribution of interview dates, we say that about one-half of these people will be 0-6 weeks younger than 65, and one-half will be 0-6 weeks older. As previously mentioned, we limit our analysis to people who are over 55 and under 75, and to regions in which most of the States have implemented the ACA by 2014.
19 The final sample size is 25,291 although some outcomes are available only for a smaller subsample.
Changes in Insurance Coverage at Age 65 and Years 2012 and 2014
As shown in Section 3.1, the identification of effect of the ACA using our fuzzy differencein-discontinuities estimator depends on several assumptions. In this section we discuss how plausible is that these assumptions are satisfied.
Let us start by noting that participation in both Medicare and ACA is partially determined by the same threshold for eligibility (people who are least at 65). This was the first requirement in our setting. Figure I illustrates this claim by showing the age profiles of health insurance coverage estimated separately for each treatment (the year 2012 for Medicare, plotted with circles, and 2014 for the ACA, plotted with diamonds). The figure shows that for each treatment, we observe a significant increase in coverage rates. This suggests that the age threshold at 65 provides a credible source of exogenous variation in insurance status for both policies.
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Figure I also illustrates a second and most important relation between how likely is that a person is eligible to Medicare and how likely is that a person is eligible to the ACA, both at the same 65 threshold: the rise in the share of coverage rate at age 65 is virtually the same for both treatments. This provides evidence that the probability of selection into Medicare and ACA are likely the same which is consistent with Assumption 5. Table I confirms the results in Figure I by showing the effects of reaching age 65 on the insurance status for Medicare (Panel A) and the ACA (Panel B) on five insurancerelated variables: the probability of Medicare coverage, the probability of any health insurance coverage, the probability of private coverage, the probability of two or more forms of coverage, and the probability that an individual's primary health insurance is a managed care program. Column (1) in Panels A and B shows that reaching age 65 significantly increases the probability of having Medicare in 2012 (Panel A) and 2014 (Panel B), and most importantly, that the increase in both probabilities is the same. Panel C confirms this result by showing the estimates of our fuzzy difference-in- 19 In the classification of the regions we follow the categorization in the public data made in the NHIS. This identifies the 4 four Census Regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West). In our baseline specification, we limit our analysis to the Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, which are the regions in which most of the states had implemented the ACA by 2014 (see the Kaiser Family Foundation, at https://www.kff.org/; see also https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/primers/medicaidmap). discontinuities estimator where the dependent variable is insurance status. Column (1) in Panel C shows that the probability of having Medicare is not affected once the ACA was introduced. Columns (3) to (5) shows that this result holds for the probability of private coverage, the probability of two or more forms of coverage, and the probability that an individual's primary health insurance is a managed care program.
Regarding the assumption about the independence of the two treatments (i.e. Assumption 4.(iii)), note that this is a strong assumption. Indeed, two policies using the same cutoff are most of the time going to complement or substitute to each other. Importantly, this seems to be the case for the ACA and Medicare. As an alternative, we propose to rely on Assumption 4'. In this respect, first note that the first part of Assumption 4'.(iii) is consistent with how the ACA and Medicare are likely to be related: all 2014 Medicare users are treated by the ACA, which in terms of O ic and M ic , means that O ic ≥ M ic . As for the second part of Assumption 4'.(iii), since it is similar to Assumption 5, then, as previously mentioned, results in Table I and Figure  I are consistent with it.
Assumptions 1 and 3 are difficult to test. However, we propose a set of placebo regressions to evaluate their plausibility. Assumption 3 is similar to the parallel trend assumption in the difference-in-differences methodology. It stipulates that in absence of the ACA program, the effect of the Medicare should be the same on the utilization of health care services. In Tables XXV to XXVII we construct placebo fuzzy differencein-discontinuities estimations for cohorts or regions only affected by Medicare at age 65. Results in Table XXV suggest that if we consider the Midwest and South regions the difference in the discontinuity in the level of access to care and health service utilization for seniors at age 65 is not different from zero at any conventional statistical level. Moreover, if we focus on the south region, as in Table XXVI , we have evidence of no change in cost-related access to care between 2012 and 2014. Our results however suggest a small but significant reduction in elderly who could nota afford a prescription medicine, specialist or follow-up visit when only the South Region is consider. Nevertheless, this result is opposite to what we found in our baseline regressions.
Turning to regions where the ACA was implemented by 2014, Table XXVII shows fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities estimations for several consecutive groups of years (previous to 2014). All but two of the differences are statistically not different from zero. These placebo regressions suggest that Medicare have the same effect irrespective of the cohorts. Overall, the placebo regressions suggest that Assumption 3 is fair and can be considered as true in our sample.
Concerning Assumption 1, it is exactly the same as that present in the standard literature that uses the age 65 in the US as a threshold (see Card et al. (2008) for an indicative list). As for Assumptions 2 or 6, at least one of them is satisfied. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there is no test for these assumptions in the panel data environment. We assume that they hold in our setting.
Empirical Results
Panel A of Table II presents the fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities estimated effects of ACA on access to care and health care services utilization of 65 years old Americans. We consider three self-reported access to care outcomes from the NHIS questionnaires: (i) "During the past 12 months has medical care been delayed for the individual because of worry about the cost?" (first column) (ii) "During the past 12 months was there any time when the individual needed medical care but did not get it because the individual could not afford it?" (second column) (iii) Did the individual have at least one doctor visit in the 12 months? (third column). In the last column, we report the estimated τ
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's regarding health care services utilization, in particular individuals' overnight hospital stays in the previous year.
The results show that, overall, individuals who reached age 65 in the year 2014 were more likely to delay care due to costs (an increase of 3.6% in the probability of delaying care). However, the estimated fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities coefficients on the other two access to care outcomes in columns (2) and (3) are not significant at the standard levels. These results suggest that the effect of ACA on cost-related access to care was mixed. Regarding health care services utilization, we note a significant increase of 4.8% in hospitalization rates at 65 years in 2014. Panel B of Table II shows the effect of ACA on several cost-related access to care outcomes for individuals at age 65. Overall, the proportion of individuals who reported that they couldn't afford to pay prescription drugs, see a specialist and have a follow-up treatment increased by 7.0%, 7.2%, and 5.5%, respectively.
We also perform a subgroup analysis considering ethnicity and education. Table III presents the breakdown of the results by ethnicity. Results reveal that for both whites (non-hispanic) and minorities (black or hispanic) there is no significant effect of ACA on either access to care or health care services utilization (first panel of Table III) . Interestingly, we observe a clear heterogeneity in the ACA's effects within individuals' ethnicity. The ACA increased the proportion of blacks (non-hispanic) aged 65 who saw a doctor the previous year by 36.7% and the proportion of whites (non-hispanic) with a least one hospitalization by 5.1%, but more hispanics couldn't have access to care the previous year for costs-related reasons (an increase of 15.6%). Moreover, the results from panel B of Table III shows that the proportion of whites (non-hispanic) who could not afford prescription drugs, a specialist visit, as well as a follow-up care increased as a consequence of the ACA. The proportion of hispanics who could not afford drugs also increased by 23.3%. Panel B in Table IV shows that the ACA significantly increased of the proportion of high school dropouts seniors who could not afford a specialist visit and a follow-up care compared to the more educated seniors. An additional 11.4% of seniors that had a college education could not afford their prescription drugs.
In short, the results suggest that, in general, the ACA exacerbates cost-related access barriers for seniors. In 2014, more individuals at age 65 delayed care, could not see a specialist, or could have access to continuity of care due to costs. This might be in part due to the fact that the implementation of the ACA is associated with the increase in Medicare Part B premiums and the reduction of the government's payment per enrollee to the private insurance companies. The ACA increased the proportion of seniors that couldn't afford prescription drugs. This is somewhat surprising since the ACA was set to reduce Medicare part D enrollees' out-of-pocket expenses. The increase in hospitalization rate might be the effect of paying physicians under the ACA based on the quality of services provided and penalizing hospitals with high readmission rates. Interestingly, the ACA significantly improved the access to physicians' services to blacks (non-hispanic) and increased hospital stays for white non-hispanic. However, under the ACA more hispanics were unable to access to care for costs-related reasons.
Robustness Checks
Identifying the effect of the ACA on access to care outcomes requires that all other factors that might affect an individual at 65 years old regarding access to care trend smoothly (Card et al., 2008) . An example of a confounding factor that could affect individuals' health outcomes at 65, is the employment status since 65 years old represents the typical retirement age and employed older adults had better health outcomes than unemployed older adults (Kachan et al., 2015) . This may lead to a biased τ
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if employment status has a significant impact on individuals' health outcomes at the discontinuity (age 65) and at the year 2014.
The estimated effect of the discontinuity at age 65 on employment status are presented in Table VI . We consider two employment variables: whether or not an individual is employed and whether or not an individual is a full-time employee. The results show non-significant coefficients, which suggests that there are no discontinuities at 65 in both cases. Figure II illustrates the non-discontinuity at age 65 in employment. We also perform the same test using different subgroups: ethnicity and education. The results are presented in Tables IX and X . Again, in all cases with all subgroups the results show that no evidence of discontinuities in employment. We obtain similar results with smaller bandwidths (see Table XV ). That is, we can rule out employment as confounding factors in the measurement of the ACA's effect on access to health care services.
We also check the robustness of the results obtained in the previous section to the inclusion of second-order polynomial terms of age (Tables XI-XIII) 
Discussion and Conclusion
The ACA has generated lots of media attention since 2009. An evaluation of this reform on the US health care system is necessary to inform the debate on the importance of the ACA. We develop and apply an identification strategy in a fuzzy difference-indiscontinuities design to tease out the causal effect of the ACA on the accessibility to care of the US population. Our identification results rely on the presence of a pooled cross-sectional or panel data-set on which a "before-and-after" policy evaluation can be applied. The partial effect of ACA or the policy of interest can be identified under a very strict condition of equality in the treatment probability changes at the cutoff point. In the case of the ACA, this condition is likely to be satisfied for the overall sample.
We apply our fuzzy difference-in-discontinuities method on self-reported access to care outcomes, using the National Health Interview Survey over a 3-year period (2012) (2013) (2014) .
Our results show that the ACA has had an adverse impact on access to health care services for costs reasons. In particular, under the ACA, the hazard of delaying care, paying drugs prescription, seeing a specialist, or having a follow-up treatment has increased because of affordability. These results suggest that an increasing number of seniors (aged 65 or more) reported unmet health care needs for the lack of financial resources. This must be a concern for policymakers as those who reported unmet health care are more likely to have a high risk of mortality (Alonso et al., 1997) and to experience deterioration in their health status (Okumura et al., 2013) . Two mechanisms might explain why the ACA increased cost-related barriers: it increased the demand of health care services increasing coverage, and reduced the supply of health services by replacing a fee-for-service (FFS) payment model under which care providers receive a fee for each service provided to patients, with a capitation-based payment model, where care providers are paid a fixed amount of money for each patient to provide a bundle of pre-determined services.
22 Note that a FFS scheme incentivizes providers to increase the quantity of services provided (Mcguire, 2000) . However, capitation creates incentives to under-provide services and may improve the quality of services (Scott, 2000) . This implies that along with facilitating access to insurance coverage, the ACA should have included measures or incentives to increase the supply of health services and prevent the increase of insurer's premiums and beneficiaries' out-of-pocket expenses. Our results also show that the ACA improved hospital stays for patients as a result of moving away from an FFS payment system to a capitation payment system, which could have rewarded quality instead of quantity.
Our results may be capturing short-term effects of the ACA in terms of access to health care services. For example, if the ACA successfully increased the quality of care through more preventive care services, the number of patients per physician might have decreased progressively, reducing the demand for care as well as health care services utilization This in turn could have reduced access to care issues. These effects could be captured in the long-term effects. Even though estimating such effects will require long panel data (which we do not have), our identification and estimation strategy will still be valid. Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age. 
Scott, A. (2000
Overall sample -0.020 -0.020 (0.039) (0.029) Observations 25159 25265
Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include quadratic control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age. Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include quadratic control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014.
Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age. Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include quadratic control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014.
Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age. Notes: All columns report the diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include quadratic control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age. Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include quadratic control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age. Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age. Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age. Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from the South region, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age. Notes: All columns report the fuzzy diff-in-discs estimates using data from Northeast, Midwest, and West regions, and comparing outcomes in years 2012 and 2014. The models include linear control for age, fully interacted with dummies for age 65 or older and year 2014. Other controls in models include indicators for gender, race/ethnicity, education and region. Samples for regression models include people ages 55-75 only, and remove from the sample the individuals who turn 65 in the first half of 2014. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by quarter of age.
